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HUMAN RIGHTS, CHILE AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Thoreau, in his 1849 essay, "Civil Disobedience," wrote that "the State
never intentionally confronts a man's sense, intellectual or moral, but only
his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit or honesty, but
with superior physical strength."' Thoreau recognized the effect of state
tyranny on humanity. Though an anarchist then, 2 he might be in favor
8
of an international legal regime for the protection of human rights today.
1. Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in THOREAU: WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 85,
97 (J. W. Krutch ed. 1962).
2. Id. at 85.
3. Philosopher Robert Nozick of Harvard would probably make an argument
against a human rights regime. See reviews of his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia
(1975) in NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1975, at 81, and Singer, The Right to be Rich or
Poor, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Mar. 6, 1975, at 19.
The power of the state is the most serious threat to an individual's human rights
but there are other menaces such as multinational corporations:
If the emergent multinationals [corporations] are not effectively subject
to national legislation, they are even less subject to the United Nations or
regional international governmental organizations (IGOs). This is so for
two stark reasons: first, both regional and world IGOs are, in practice, simply the creatures of the strongest national government(s) within them ...
Furthermore, human-rights IGOs-for example, the UN Commission on
Human Rights is an appropriate model-constitute no effective check on the
dehumanizing tendencies of either multinational corporations or member
states . ..
Scoble & Wiseberg, Human Rights and Amnesty International, 413 ANNALS 11, 16
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Scoble & Wiseberg]. ITT must bear some responsibility
for violations of human rights in Chile because of its involvement in the overthrow
of the Allende Government by volunteering funds to the CIA. N.Y. Times, July
25, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Sept. 17, 1974, at 10, col. 5; June 22, 1973, at 1, col. 2; Mar.
28, 1973, at 3, col. 1; Mar. 21, 1973, at 1,col. 4. (The United States and the CIA,
of course, were also integrally involved in the Chilean upheaval. N.Y. Times, Feb.
10, 1975, at 1, col. 7; see also Wicker, The Right Focus on the C.I.A., N.Y. Times,
Feb. 14, 1975, at 37, col. 1).
Increased complexity and industrialization and the response of law may come to
a head in the further development of international law and the spread of multinational corporations. International law may develop as a response to the demands of
the global commerce of national corporations instead of to humanitarian needs. I
believe this is an implication of Shirley Hazzard's article, The United Nations:

Where Governments Go to Church, THE

NEW REPUBLIC,

Mar. 1, 1975, at 11, 12.

See also Heilbroner, None of Your Business, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Mar. 20, 1975, at
6. For another perspective, see Bliss, Risky Game of International Clout, Chicago
Daily News, Apr. 9, 1975, at 27, col. 1 and The New Global Lords, Chicago Daily
News, Apr. 5-6, 1975, § 2, at 17, col. 1.
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The more industrialized and technologically advanced a society or a complex of societies becomes, the more tenuous does the status of the individ4
ual become in the state.
Within the restrictions of a review essay, this comment examines contemporary human rights in the context of definition, violation and enforcement. Several publications in the last two years have dealt with the existence and law of human rights, the violation of human rights in Chile 5 and
the work of international organizations in the area of human rights. 6
I.

HUMAN RIGHTS: THEIR EXISTENCE AS LAW

For Americans, it may not be difficult to point to fundamental human
rights; the Bill of Rights offers a guide to at least some of these. However,
conceptions of and priorities concerning fundamental rights vary from one
nation -to another so that international agreement is difficult. For example, the third world may justifiably emphasize cultural and economic
rights as much as civil and political rights. Even if predominance of one
type or set of rights over another is not important, defining and determining basic human rights defies agreement, if not concensus. While it is true
that nations have broadly assented to what human rights are, 7 differences
do arise as to when or if those rights have been violated. Despite the
fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international covenants and regional conventions refer to commonly accepted human rights,
one is compelled to look beyond these documents for meaningful definitions.
4. Perhaps the proliferation of corporate venturousness throughout society has
displaced the characteristics of industrialization of society. See generally M. MINTZ
& J. COHEN, AMERICA, INC. (1971).

5. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 6 for a survey of the serious conditions in Chile one year after the coup.
6. For a survey of the area of human rights, see Symposium on International
Human Rights, 21 DEPAUL L. REv. 271 et seq. (1971). Essential to any study of
the protection of human rights is L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973) [hereinafter cited as SOHN & BUERGENTHAL].
7. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Because the Declaration is
such a significant and basic document, it is cited just as the U.N. Charter or U.S.
Constitution is-without a specific reference or source. However, the document can
be found in the following: G.A. Res. 217 A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE
U.N. DOC. ST/HR/1 (1973); L. SOHN & T. BUEROENTHAL, BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 30 (1973) (this is

UNITED NATIONS,

a supplement to

SOHN

&

BUERGENTHAL,

supra note 6) [hereinafter cited as BASIC

DOCUMENTS].

Nations have bound themselves by law to recognize human rights through international covenants and regional conventions.
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In 1973, on the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal
Declaration, the United Nations issued Human Rights: A Compilation
of InternationalInstruments of the United Nations.8 The publication contains no analysis, annotations or commentaries but only the complete texts
of forty-one human rights instruments. The value of the text is in its inclusion of the international human rights law promulgated under the
auspices of the United Nations. 9 The Compilation differs from Professors
Sohn and Buergenthal's supplement' 0 to their recent text, International
Protection of Human Rights," in that U.N. Compilation contains only

United Nations instruments, notably the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Moreover, it includes conventions that may not be considered human
rights law but bear on human rights. The Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 12 the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,' 8 and the Convention on the International
Right of Correction 14 are three examples. On the other hand, the professors' supplement contains a greater cross-section of documents than does
U.N. Compilation; for example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," the American Convention on Human Rights6 and various "Documents of Historical Im17

portance.'
The Human Rights Bulletin, published by the Division of Human
Rights of the United Nations Secretariat, is a research tool for those involved in human rights but it is not a supplement to the U.N. Compilation. It does not have in-depth analysis of human rights development but
is intended to "facilitate research by those who are interested in undertaking independent studies of United Nations human rights programmes." ' 8
8. HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as U.N. COMPILA-

TION].
9. Some may take issue, however, since U.N. Compilation does not include the
draft, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
10. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 7.
11. Supra note 6. Both the text and supplement were reviewed in Coleman, Book
Review, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 1010 (1974).
12. U.N. COMPILATION, supra note 8, at 20.
13. Id. at 66.
14. Id. at 79.

15.

BASIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 7, at 125.

16.
17.
18.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 235 et seq.
Introduction, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS BULL. 3 (1970).
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Despite disclaiming as its purpose the presentation of "a survey of the activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the field of
human rights," the Bulletin belies its disclaimer. 19 The Bulletin reports
on the work of ad hoc Working Groups of Experts, meetings of parties to
the conventions, seminars on human rights, sessions of the Human Rights
Commission and the various sub-commissions, the human rights activities
of the specialized agencies and other United Nations agencies. It also
publishes excerpts on human rights from the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, General Assembly and

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolutions on human rights, conventions and drafts of conventions; moreover, it lists resolutions, documents and publications on human rights generally. The Bulletin gives the
status of signatures, ratifications, accessions and successions to human
20
rights covenants and conventions.
An inspection of these and other publications might lead one to conclude that human rights, as a legal concept, implies solely civil and political rights.
Human rights is a broad, constantly changing concept which we take to
include the following irreducible minima: (1) physical security-that is, a
right to life; (2) freedom of religion; and (3) the combined political rights
of association, communication
processes to one's rulers.21

and other peaceful

opinion-transmission

However, human rights are not so limited; a glimpse of the organization
of U.N. Compilation clearly establishes this fact. Human rights encompasses self-determination of peoples, discrimination, war crimes and genocide, slavery and forced labor, "nationality, statelessness, asylum and refugees,1'22 employment and the right to enjoy culture. 28

Nevertheless, the

blatant violations of human rights are usually those of a civil and political
nature. Hence the concern of many is not only with the Universal Declaration but with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights2 4
25
and the regional conventions.
19.
20.
21.

Id. Its usefulness as a research tool can be seen in note 24 infra.
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS BULL.
SCOBLE & WISEBERG, supra note 3, at 12.

22. U.N. COMPILATION, supra note 8, at v.
23. See generally id.
24. Opened for signature December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 GAOR Supp.
16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (1966); U.N. COMPILATION, supra note 8, at 7.
Covenant has not entered into force. By article 49, 35 nations must ratify it and
as of June 1974, only twenty-seven had done so. 11 HUMAN RIGHTS BULL. 27
(1974). The ratifiers include the Soviet Union, 10 HUMAN RIPFrrs BULL. 55 (1973),
and Chile, 7 HUMAN RiGHTs BULL. 42 (1972), but not the United States.
25. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
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A perusal of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant reveals the problem
of interpretation or "broadness" referred to above. Some of the provisions

are general, even vague. Common assent necessitates this. But specific
clauses are clear. Article seven, for example, requires that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation." Nations may quibble,
but there can be little doubt of the intent to prevent brutal intimidation
such as interrogation procedures employing physical beatings. 26 The
European and American Conventions reflect a similar intent.27 Thus, the
purpose of international human rights law becomes clear despite the lack
of precision. Certain acts are intended to be outlawed and when those
acts are committed they can be recognized. With this common understanding, four separate reports independently concluded that human rights

have been violated in Chile since September 11, 1973, when a military
coup overthrew the Marxist Government of the duly elected president,
2
Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens. 8
Freedoms, opened for signature November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter

cited as European Convention];
HUMAN RIGHTS:

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
COLLECTED TEXTS 1 (1974); BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 7, at

125, which has been in force since 1953. American Convention on Human Rights,
opened for signature November 22, 1969, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21,
at 50 (1970) [hereinafter cited as American Convention]; BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra
note 7, at 209, which is not yet in force.
26. Various articles have confirmed the use of torture and confinement of political prisoners from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to the Philippines and South
Korea. Kovanda, Czechoslovakia's Imprisoned Conscience, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar.
20, 1975, at 25; Gandelman, Civil Rights Put in Limbo in Most of S. Asia, Chicago
Daily News, Jan. 6, 1975, at 24, col. 3; Shelton, The Geography of Disgrace: A
World Survey of Political Prisoners, SATURDAY REV./WORLD, June 15, 1974, at 14;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 5, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA (Sept. 1974); Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, May 12, 1973, at 31. India's
detention of political opponents without the recognition of civil liberties is not new,
it has only drastically increased in recent weeks. See N.Y. Times, July 25, 1975,
at 3, col. 1; July 24, 1975, at 1, col. 7; July 23, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE (American ed. 1975). I
had hoped to review the American edition, an update of the British edition of 1973,
but it was not available until after the press deadline.
27. Article three of the European Convention, supra note 25, reads, "No one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Article 5(2) of the American Convention, supra note 25, states, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. All
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity
of the human person."
28. The four Reports which are reviewed to different degrees in this essay are:
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHILE: AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1974)
[hereinafter cited as AMNESTY REPORT]; CHICAGO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO
STATUS OF HUMAN RIGrrs IN CHILE, REPORT (1974) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO
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CHILE: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Report of the Chicago Commission of Inquiry into the Status of
Human Rights in Chile and Chile: An Amnesty International Report
are perhaps better known than other reports examining human rights violations in Chile because they have been discussed in other publications.2 9
The most comprehensive report-the largest, at any rate-is the Report
on the Status of Human Rights in Chile by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.).
A fourth report is that done by the respected International Commission
30
of Jurists.
The Reports confirm each other's observations. This is important because, as each Report makes evident, accurate statistics and information
were not always available; 3 1 moreover, sources are sometimes, regrettably
but understandably, not given in order to protect those individuals involved. 8 2 While the Junta permitted the visits by the four investigatory
bodies, it was not as cooperative as it could have been.83 Members of
the Chicago Commission "were impressed by the fact that those Junta
representatives [interviewed] felt most assured that they can present ob'3 4
viously transparent lies with utmost impunity.
Each Report emphasizes that the question of justification for the overthrow of the Allende Government was not a part of its investigatory work.
REPORT]; INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE STATUS

OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/l.34, doc. 21 corr. 1
(1974) [hereinafter cited as O.A.S. REPORT]; INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS,
FINAL REPORT OF MISSION TO CHILE TO STUDY THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE PRO-

TECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1974)

[hereinafter cited as JURISTS REPORT].
In this essay,
more attention will be paid to these two reports than the other two.
30. The Jurists Report and the O.A.S. Report were cited by the United Nations
and vociferously criticized by the Chilean delegation. 31 U.N. ESOSOC 1, U.N.

29.

E.g., Terror in Chile, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 30, 1974, at 38.

Doc. E/CN.4/1174/Add. 1 (1975).
31. See, e.g., AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 16; and CHICAGO REPORT, supra
note 28, at 3.
32.

See generally CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 28, at 3, 7.

33.
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY
THE O.A.S. IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1974, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.

34, doc. 29, at 9-10 (1975).
The Commission visited many detention centers where its members spoke
freely with prisoners. Although the Commission was provided with ample
facilities by the Government of Chile, it was not permitted to visit three
establishments, generally pointed out by prisoners as the principal centers
at which physical and psychological pressures were applied, because they
had been declared military zones.

id.
34.

CHIcAGo REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.
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The common purpose is to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations
of human rights violations.35 Interestingly, none of the Reports acknowledge the fact of Chile's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. That the Covenant is not yet in force does not mean
it is not a customary expression of international human rights law. 36 On
the basis of fifty-one nations having signed and twenty-seven nations having ratified87 the Covenant and on the basis of the General Assembly's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a customary acceptance of international human rights law is expressed.3
The Chicago Commission of Inquiry into the Status of Human Rights
in Chile is an ad hoc group which was established to do what its name
indicates.

"Of particular concern . . . were . . . the circumstances sur-

rounding the death of Frank Teruggi Jr. [a Chicago native and son of
one of the Commission members] and the role of the United States Embassy in protecting United States citizens."' 39 The Commission was com35. Id. at 1-2; AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 7-14; JuRISTS REPORT, supra
note 28, at 3; O.A.S. REPORT, supra note 28, at 1.
36. Aside from a moral obligation emanating from the fact of ratification of a
treaty not yet in force, a legal obligation can also be incurred. Hence it can be argued that Chile had incurred such an obligation on the basis of international legal
custom and the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." I.C.J.
STAT. art. 38, para. 1.
Cf. H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 et seq. (1927, reprinted 1970).
In HEARINGS ON THE INT'L PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.
ON INT'L ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS ON THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 203 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fraser Report], Professor Thomas Buergenthal of Buffalo elaborated on this view when speaking of Brazil's obligation to observe human rights law. (These Hearings have become known as
the Fraser Report, named after the chairman of this subcommittee, Rep. Donald
Fraser of Minnesota. It is deserving of a review in itself but that is beyond the scope
of this Comment).

37.

11 HUMAN RIGHTS BULL. 27 (1974).

38. In addressing itself to the suspension of some legal guarantees during "convulsive periods" of government upheaval, the O.A.S. Report stated that the American
Convention on Human Rights was to be the "normative system" to be applied to such
change. Though failing to note Chile's ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the O.A.S. Report informs us that Chile is a signatory
to the American Convention on Human Rights (which is also not in force). This
only serves to reinforce the view that international human rights law is binding even
if the Conventions are not in force or have not been ratified. O.A.S. REPORT, supra
note 28, at 2-3.
39. CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 28, at 2. The Report leaves no doubt that the
United States did little to protect its citizens who were caught up in the tragic events.
But this reflects the American policy towards the coup. The United States abstained
from voting on a resolution concerned with Chilean violations of human rights
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The United States delegation's
rationale for not voting was ". . . we are asked to vote on a resolution which provides
not even a hint that there has been improvement in the situation in Chile since the
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prised of a cross-section of Chicago citizens including teachers, clerics and
40
labor union members.
The Report itself is divided into two parts of which Part I is an introduction and summary analysis of the major areas of concern. The areas are:
distinctions between "state of war" and "state of seige," torture and
searches and seizures, detentions and executions, right to counsel, the state
of the economy and trade unions, social services and the media. 41 Part
II consists of interviews with officials and protected sources and "chance
encounters '42 and a compilation of documents. The documents furnish
Human Rights Commission communicated with the Chilean Government ......
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 13, U.S. POsrrIONS AT 29TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 18 (Feb. 1975). The United States did say that its abstention was
also based on the view, which is true enough, that "some of the cosponsors have denounced reported violations of human rights in Chile in the strongest terms while
many of these same rights do not exist in their own countries." Id. However, it
is not unreasonable to conclude that more sinister motives have prompted a patronizing or supportive attitude towards the Chilean Junta. See How to Lie in Washington and Get Away With It, N.Y. REv. BooKs, July 17, 1975, at 39.
40. CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 28, at 1.
41. The "summary analysis," which comes before the documents, consists of topical paragraphic statements with reference to the documents in Part II. Id. at 7-8.
The Report is organized topically to cover the subjects listed above. As
its purpose is exclusively to present the findings of eight days of investigations and interviews, no attempt is made to reach any summary judgment
concerning these findings. The Report represents the findings of the twelve
members of the Commission and may include information available elsewhere. Such duplication is unavoidable and in fact corroborates the findings.
On the other hand, it must be emphasized that this Report is in no way
intended to provide complete information on the present state of human
rights in Chile. It covers only the information obtained first hand by the
members of the Commission during its stay in Chile. No attempt has been
made to draw upon any other sources.
Id. at 7.
42. Id. at I-III.
The members of the Commission interviewed more than 65 persons.
Among them were the Junta Minister of the Interior, General Oscar Bonilla; Vice Minister of Justice Max Silva; Jose Miguel de la Cruz, official
in the Ministry of Foreign Relations; the Chief of the Estadio Chile Prison;
the Chief of Detention Camps and Prisons; officials of labor unions retained by the Junta; United States Ambassador David Popper; other officials of the U.S. Embassy; the ambassadors and high ranking officials of
some Western European embassies; personnel of private American organizations in Santiago; the executive secretaries of Committee No. 1 (refugees)
and Committee No. 2 (Chileans); the director and manager of the Bank
of Israel; leaders of the Christian community. In addition, evidence was
obtained from prisoners in the Estadio Chile Prison, relatives of persons detained or executed, trade union officials removed by the Junta and numerous
individuals who cannot be identified. Some of the evidence is available in
the form of written eye-witness accounts, written depositions and official
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fascinating but distressing accounts of the sufferings and deaths of many
43
individuals.
The Amnesty Report, in contrast, is in narrative rather than outline
form. 4 4 It begins with a background synopisis of the Allende Government
and its overthrow by the Junta without apologizing for either. 4 5 The Report then continues with succinct abstracts of the broad but serious issues
of "political prisoners," executions and disappearances, torture and refugees. The appendix contains specific cases and a chronology of Amnesty
46
International's investigatory activities in Chile.
Because, from its inception, Amnesty International has been concerned
with prisoners who have been jailed and tortured for their political beliefs,
Amnesty limited its investigation and report to "the situation of political
prisoners, their identity, their legal situation, their treatment and conditions."' 47 In the course of its observations, Amnesty found that the Chilean judiciary was either unable or unwilling to act independently of the
Junta. Consequently, greater emphasis is placed on the "analysis of military justice in Chile and a description of the severe and almost insurmountable problems facing lawyers who have attempted to give a serious
' 48
defence to political prisoners.
If there is skepticism or misunderstanding about what prisoners in Chile
face, one might consider the view of the Chilean military physician 49 who
in a policy statement determined the existence of five categories or degrees
of support for the Popular Unity Government of Allende: extremists, activists, ideological activists, militants and sympathizers. The first two were
considered "irredeemable" by the doctor. 50 This view hardly reflects an
intent to unite the country; indeed it seems to be a policy reflecting imprisonment without cause-or cause consisting of nothing other than political belief or activity. An "accused" might be guilty only because he supported a previously legitimate government-legitimate at least up to Sepdocuments. Several of these documents are appended to this Report.
Id. at 6.
43. Id. at IV, 1.
44. Compare AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, with CHICAGO REPORT, supra note
28.
45. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 9-14.
46. Id. at 70 et seq.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id.
49. Dr. Augusto Schuster Cortes. CmCAGO REPORT, supra note 28, at IV, 11.
50. Id.
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tember 11, 1973.5 1 Here is the crucial issue for justice under the Junta:
whether the activities of an individual were in support of or against the
Popular Unity Government. 52 This defies all requirements of legal notice
not to mention the freedoms of expression and association; nevertheless,
such is the burden of the political prisoner.53 The central question for
observers is whether the Junta's framing of the issue mocks basic standards
of justice.
The Reports vary on the number of political prisoners held in Chile.
Amnesty reported that official government figures were given at 3,000 to
4,000 while the Church estimated 10,000 people in detention one year
51. Members of the Chicago Commission were told "only the guilty are being
detained." Id. at 16. The question, of course, is guilty of what.
52. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 52-53.
In other words the prosecution has claimed that all those political parties
which formed the constitutionally and democratically-elected government of
President Allende were rebellious forces, organized in a military fashion,
which were the enemy of the Chilean people even before the military coup.
The paradoxical nature of this argument is clear to any observer. It suggests that all members of the military who in any way collaborated with
the constitutional government before the coup, could be charged with high
treason. Small wonder that many lawyers have pointed out that, in accordance with this interpretation, both President Pinochet (Commander-inChief of the Army during the Allende government) and Foreign Minister
Huerta Diaz (who held a ministerial post during the Allende government)
could be charged on the same ground, because of their past collaborations
with the Popular Unity government.

Id.
53. See O.A.S. REPORT, supra note 28, at 170; see also AMNESTY REPORT, supra
note 28, at 9.
Since September 1973 the junta has attempted to justify its actions by arguing that equivalent violations of human rights took place under the Allende government. It is important to examine this claim in some detail.
In January 1974 the Chilean Foreign Ministry, rejecting the report of
Amnesty International's mission to Chile, commented in a news release:
Amnesty International's impartiality is somewhat placed in doubt by
its almost incredible lack of interest in protecting human rights in
Chile during Allende's government. During that period human rights
were systematically trampled on through political assassination, arbitrary arrests of journalists and professional people, torture of political
adversaries, illegal seizures, etc.
It is difficult to substantiate these allegations. Political arrests certainly
took place under Allende. . . . Such political arrests occurred mainly during the periodic states of emergency that were proclaimed throughout the
three years of the Allende government. Yet detained persons were released
within a few days, on the termination of the State of Emergency. Restrictions also were placed sporadically on the freedom of the press. . . . Yet
such restrictions were temporary, in contrast to the permanent dissolution
since the coup of all newspapers which supported the Allende government.
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ago. 54 The Chicago Report gives the figure of 18,000 as of January
1974, 55 while the O.A.S. Report is more conservative in its estimation that
5,500 were detained as of July 1974.56 Whatever the figure, there is no
disagreement that detainees are now being held incommunicado5 7 for indefinite periods5" without charge or known charge. 59 The last assertion
can be amended to the extent that while some have been held without
charge in "administrative detention," 60 others are actually charged with
participation in the previous government 6' or with "Marxism" under the
Junta's Decree Law 77.12 This is in clear and unequivocal violation of
the American Convention on Human Rights: "right to personal liberty"
(article seven),68 "freedom of thought and expression" (article 13), "free54. Spring 1974. Id. at 16.
55. CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 28, at 3.
56. O.A.S. REPORT, supra note 28, at 169. The figure was recently put at 8,000
prisoners in an article in N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1975, at 17, col. 1.
57. CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 28, at 16.

58.

AMNESTY REPORT,

supra note 28, at 15.

59. See, e.g., CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 28, at 16.
60. JuRIsTs REPORT, supra note 28, at 26.
61. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 15.
Most tried prisoners have been charged with direct or indirect participation
in Plan Z [alleged by the Junta to be a self-directed coup by Allende and
his supporters]. Other prisoners charged under the Law of Internal Security have been accused of such ambiguous offences as the propagation of
Marxist doctrine, or even participation in university demonstrations or land
"invasions" several years before the time of the military coup. Recent trials
indicate that the juridical basis for the charges is the tenet that all political
parties that supported the Allende government were organized in a military
fashion- and were acting outside the law (emphasis added). By this juridical interpretation, all Chileans who were "activists" within the Popular
Unity government in any field . . . may be liable to dismissal from their
profession or prosecution for "criminal offences".
Id.
62. O.A.S. REPORT, supra note 28, at 170.
The Commission found that, as a result of Decree-Law 77, Marxism is
generically considered as a felony. The term "Marxism" is used as though
it were a label for a crime. Consequently, any individual professing Marxist ideology is considered as a criminal, regardless of whether he can be
shown to have actually committed acts defined as crimes under criminal
law. He can therefore be punished for "what he is" or for "what he
thinks", regardless of "what he does". The commission of the same act in
the same circumstances can give rise to different legal consequences depending on the persons who committed the act and their political ideology, without any rule of justice or reasonableness to justify such disparity of treatment.

Id.
63.

Article 7 of the American Convention, supra note 25, reads:
1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and security.
2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons
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dom of association" (article 16), and the "right to equal protection before
the law" (article 24). Under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, essentially the same provisions have been violated by the
Junta: articles 9,64 14,05 19,66 2167 as well as the appropriate ex post
facto clause, article 15: "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was com-

mitted."6 8
Article 6 of the International Covenant states: "Every human being
has the inherent right to life.

This right shall be protected by law.

No

one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his right." Article 4(4) of the American Convention is more emphatic: "In no case shall capital punishment
be inflicted for political offenses or related common crimes."

Yet execu-

tions seem to have occurred with regularity. If it were not a matter of
7
official summary executions, 69 then it is a simple issue of disappearance 0
and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the
State Party concerned or by a law pursuant thereto.
3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.
4. Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the reasons for his detention and shall be promptly notified of the charge or charges against him.
64. U.N. COMPILATION, supra note 8, at 9:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are [sic] established by law.
2. Enyone [sic] who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest,
of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges
against him.
65. Id. at 10:
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law ...
Considering the abdication of the judiciary's responsibility to the Junta, this is quite
relevant. JuRisTs REPORT, supra note 28, at 15 et seq., 35.
66. U.N. COMPILATION, supra note 8, at 11:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
67. Id. at 11: "The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.
68. Id. at 10. See generally JuRisTs REPORT, supra note 28, at 10-11.
69. Id. at 20. See JuRusTs REPORT, supra note 28, at 20-21. See also N.Y.
Times, Sept. 24, 1973, at 4, col. 5.
70. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 34-36.
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or ley de fuga-"shot trying to escape."' 1 In few, if any, of the cases
were legal proceedings instituted before the executions occurred. 72 Indeed, General Stark's death trip through northern Chile before October
24, 1973, may have exemplified the typical "legal execution." According
to the Amnesty Report, "68 prisoners were suddenly executed in five separate towns."'78 Again, there is a variance among the reports as to the actual number summarily executed but all the Reports agree that "a vast"
if "unknown number of people-estimates range fro
5,000 to over
30,000-have lost their lives in Chile since the military coup."' 74 Fortunately, further executions have not been carried out for more than a
75
year.
While the executions have stopped, other violations of human rights
have continued. The right to counsel is ignored, habeas corpus or amparo
is suspended, torture remains. 76 The violation of the international covenants' provisions of right to legal assistance 77 is part of a larger issue. It
is the failure of judicial protection and the judiciary's abandonment of
jurisdiction to the military courts. 78 The Chilean Supreme Court did this
71. JURISTs REPORT, supra note 28, at 21. "As of December 11, 1973, there have
been at least 42 published reports of more than 410 persons killed while 'attempting
to escape.'" CHicAGo REPORT, supra note 28, at 3. The "law of flight" was dictated
by the Junta in the form of Decree Law no. 5. O.A.S. REPORT, supra note 28, at

152.
72.

AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 34.
73. Id. at 32. This is confirmed by both the CHicAo REPORT, supra note 28,
at 19-20, and JuRIsTs REPORT, supra note 28, at 21.
74. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 31.
75. Id. at 33. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1974, at 13, col. 1, reported two more executions in 1974.
76. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1974, at 15, col. 1; NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1975, at 51.
77. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, provides:
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not
have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to
him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay
for it. ..
U.N. COMPILATION, supra note 8, at 10. For examples of violations of 3 (a) and
(b), see text accompanying notes 54-68 supra.
78. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 43-44. "All trials have been conducted
by military courts ..
" Id. at 37.
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formally by ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on habeas corpus
(amparo) for prisoners because "military Tribunals in Time of War" have
this power. 79 However, the question of the lack of judicial and legal guarantees can be isolated in order to focus on the denial of legal counsel.
Amnesty found that lawyers were unable on many occasions not only
to obtain the files on their clients but to consult with them; there is the
case of one "lawyer who first read in the Chilean press that his client had
been sentenced by a military tribunal." 8 0 The Junta, of course, is to
blame but the Supreme Court and Chilean Bar Association must share responsibility. In an interview with the Amnesty delegation, the president
of the Supreme Court, who had previously been "hostile to the Allende
Government," was unconcerned with the extension of an official "state of
war" and lack of legal guarantees. 8 ' Nor has the Bar Association, which
had been critical of the Popular Unity Government, "condemned the violations of human rights under the junta."'8 2 For those lawyers willing to undertake legal defenses, there were risks, either to them or to their clients.
83
Some attorneys were imprisoned while the clients of others suffered.
79. Id. at 43-44. "The fundamental point, however, is that the Minister of Justice
has virtually no power in Chile, for as long as the state of siege lasts." Id. See
also JURISTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 22.
80. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 43.
Lawyers have not been granted facilities to undertake defence of prisoners
without difficulty, but have consistently been harassed, and have frequently
been prevented from consulting their client. Lawyers have not been able
to obtain the dossiers to the trials in order "to prepare the defence in a responsible and serious manner", but have sometimes been given a period of
only three hours in which to prepare the defence.
Id.
81. Id. at 44-45.
82. Id. at 45. One organized exception to the blanket acceptance of the Junta
and its policies in Chile is the Committee of Cooperation for Peace.
In October 1973, the one organization that did try to intercede on behalf
of all political prisoners was the Committee of Cooperation for Peace, a
committee set up under the auspices of several Chilean churches....
The Committee of Cooperation for Peace has performed a task of great
importance during the first year of military rule. With the support of the
Roman Catholic Church hierarchy (the only organization in Chile which
has been able to criticize the junta openly) it has had a certain degree of
protection. It now has the support of Christian Democrat and even some
Up to the end of October, when
pro-junta lawyers throughout Chile. ..
the courts martial were convened in total secrecy, it was often impossible
to arrange for any form of legal defence. On other occasions, the committee had to find lawyers who would attempt to prepare a legal defence in
a matter of two to three hours. By June 1974 the committee has been recognized both within Chile and abroad as the organization most equipped
to fight for increased guarantees for political prisoners.
Id. at 46-48.
83. Id. at 48.

In the first months after the coup, individual lawyers were reluctant to
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Amnesty International has concluded that three "stages" of legal protection are discernible. At the earliest stage, immediately following the overthrow, there existed no legal defense. The second period was marked by
exceedingly difficult obstacles to preparing a defense for the accused. At
the final level, Amnesty observed a more efficient operation of the military
courts but noted the existence of the same barriers to defending political
prisoners. 84 Though the various Reports differ in degree, they all agree
85
that there has been a lack of access to lawyers.
The descriptions of the official policy 8 of torture in Chile do not only
upset but immunize one to the plight of each individual. Representatives
of the Junta, as might be expected, deny the use of torture as an institututionalized policy and procedure for interrogation but admit there may have
been isolated examples.8 7 Their position is difficult to accept. If the Reports88 as well as other sources 9 have been able to "uncover" the pervasive use of torture-including the actual examination of some of those
allegedly tortured-and if the Junta is still unaware, it can hardly claim
the status of an informed and legitimate government effectively fulfilling
its role.
Torture may have decreased in use since September 11, 1973,90 but it
has "become commonplace" in its "calculated and systematic" application. 9 ' One of the brutal examples presented by the Chicago Commission 92 and Amnesty International 93 is that of Victor Jara, the Chilean poet
criticize the junta openly, and the majority were unwilling--or unable-to
undertake the defence of political prisoners. Many lawyers were harassed;
others were imprisoned. One lawyer was prevented from defending political prisoners because he found that military tribunals deliberately passed exaggeratedly high sentences for every prisoner whom he attempted to defend.

Another lawyer was physically assaulted in the north of Chile by military
troops, simply because he had undertaken the defence of a political prisoner.
Id.
84. Id. at 46-47.
85. CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 28, at 17; JuRisTs REPORT, supra note 28, at
13-19, 22; O.A.S. REPORT, supra note 28, at 140, 146. See generally Recommendations, O.A.S. REPORT, supra note 28, at 171.
86. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 60.
87. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1174/Add.1, Annex I, at 4 (1975).
88. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 57-63; CHICAGo REPORT, supra note 28,
at 9-14, 17-19; JURISTs REPORT, supra note 28, at 24-26; O.A.S. REPORT, supra note
28, at 77-82.
89. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 59, for "other sources." See also
N.Y. Times cited in notes 5 and 76, supra.
90. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 62.

91.
92.

Id. at 60.

CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 28, at IV, 1.
to his sufferings, see id. at IV, 2.
93. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 62.

For his final poem, a testament
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and musician, who was tortured and killed. Some of the places of detention used for torture are known but they were not the generally "recognized
places of detention. '94 Not surprisingly and despite Junta denials, there
is evidence that the Brazilian police, noted for its expertise in torture
methods, 5 has been involved. 96
All this points to a mockery of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 97 But in "this crucial field [of prisoners of conscience], few mem-

bers of the United Nations have lived up to their obligations." 9 8 Some
countries, notably Chile, have violated even the very minimal standards
established by human rights law.
III.

INTENATIONAL OGANIZATIONS:
ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

State sovereignty is the obstacle limiting an international organization's
94. Id. at 27.
95. An artistic statement on this is the French film "State of Siege," directed by
Costa-Gavras and starring Yves Montand.
96. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 25-26. "All the lies invented by the military about foreign intervention in the Allende government will be unmasked. It is
they who have summoned the Brazilian police in order to receive a new type of training-the torture of political prisoners." A Brazilian, detained by the Chile Junta,
quoted in id.
97. See note 7 supra. The Declaration is not a legal instrument nor a moral
imperative as the intentions of the drafters and members of the General Assembly
in 1948 made clear. However, it has the effect of being a declaratory prelude or
preamble to an international bill of rights; i.e., the existing human rights covenants
and conventions. See generally Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 25 BR. Y.B. INT'L L. 354 (1948).
98. Morris, Prisonersof Conscience, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1972, at 33, col. 6.
It is also worth quoting from Atlas:
Whether a man "goes out of his mind" from the pain of needles under
his fingernails or from an electronically induced delirium, the final effect
remains that of an unbearable sense of loss, not only of control but ultimately of identity. He becomes, in Sartre's words, "detached nrom his real
self." It is in this utter diminishment of humanity that torture reveals its
ultimate character.
Clavel, The Kafkaesque World of Torture, ATLAs, June 1974, at 34 (adapted from
CANADIAN F.). The essence of this "detachment" is stated in different words in an
"account of conditions in the Chile Stadium [in Santiago], written by a group of
Brazilians detained there." AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 28, at 19.
The climate of tension even affected the soldiers, who after days addressed themselves to the prisoners and tried to calm them, confessing that
they too were affected by the tension. This tension reached such a level
that, when the commander talked of peace and calm in one of his speeches,
he was mechanically applauded by the prisoners, thus creating a surrealistic
picture. This applause represented all the protest or impotency of the prisoners faced with terror and violence.
Id. at 23.

19751

1015

COMMENTS

effective response to human rights violations, and a restriction which thoroughly pervades any discussion of international enforcement. 99 Whether
writers note this or not, it is always implicit. Even those nations supporting
the United Nations have no desire to give up their sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations recognizes this' 0 0 and Oscar Schachter, long associated with the United Nations, has confirmed it, stating that coercion
from outside a state is "regarded as inimical" by that state.' 0 '
The role of the United Nations as an intervenor in internal conflicts
is one of -the particular areas studied in Law and Civil War in the Modern
World, edited by John Norton Moore under the auspices of the Panel on
the Role of International Law in Civil Wars of the American Society of
International Law. The purpose of the "culminating study" of the Panel's
Civil War Project is a "theoretical inquiry concerning the role of law in
civil wars and how law and legal institutions might be made more relevant
to the challenge.' 0 2 According to Moore, Law and Civil War "builds on
. . . earlier studies"' 03 and is an attempt to "probe" the "emerging
[international] legal order" and to devise a framework for analysis of both
04
legal structure and "revolutionary and interventionary violence."'
99. This accounts for the seeming impunity with which a nation violates human
rights. The issue of state sovereignty permeates international law and confounds international lawyers. The lack of enforcement measures in international law is one
of the resulting criticisms. Whether the discussion centers on international force or
other modes of coercion, the conclusion remains the same. For a recent discussion
of whether the "force of law" or "law of force" rules in international society, see
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (F. Northedge ed. 1974).
100. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 1 and 7. Paragraph 7 reads:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters
to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VI.
101. Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in LAW AND CIVIL
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 401, 406 (J. N. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Schachter].

102.

Moore, Introduction, in

LAw AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD xix (J.

N. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Introduction].
103. Id. at xx. See, e.g., THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (J.N. Moore ed. 1974);
W. KANE, CIVIL STRIFE IN LATIN AMERICA: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT
(1972); THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR (R. Falk ed. 1971); 1-3 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

104.

(R. Falk ed. 1967, -70, -72).

Introduction, supra note 102, at xx.

One of the frameworks for analysis

presented is the "New Haven approach" or "minimum world order" view of McDougal and Lasswell, i.e., their complex policy-oriented approach. Introduction, supra note 102, at xxi, and Moore, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of
Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 3, 7, 12-18 (J.N. Moore
ed. 1974). Offering this analysis is a response to the lack of an accepted framework.
"A principal shortcoming of the work to date on revolution and intervention-
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International law has no standards for establishing responsibility for and
effectively resolving conflicts, whether internal or not. 10 5 One of the reasons could be that the causes of conflicts, especially internal conflicts, are
"self-determination, human rights, and modernization, combined with a variety of intense ideological conflicts."' 1 6 Another, and more obvious, reason is that under Article 2(7) of the Charter, 10 7 the United Nations may
not intervene in matters "deemed essentially domestic;"' 08 consequently,
intervention has occurred where the issue was not characterized as "domestic."

Despite the legal possibility of intervening in the affairs of a state, the
United Nations has no "hierarchy" of priorities when it comes to determining whether an internal problem becomes a serious threat to international
peace. 10 9 Given the possibility that an internal problem may breech the
peace, it is unlikely that the United Nations will act if intervention is not
in the "perceived interests of the majority of states." 1 0 Schachter notes
that among the goals which the United Nations has "perceived" as justifying intervention are "international peace and security," threats to a nation's sovereignty and independence, "[p]romotion and protection of fundamental human rights," and "[a]lleviation of massive suffering.""'
He
states that human rights violations have usually been involved in most of
those internal conflicts which have received attention in the "international
forum" and have involved the United Nations. But Schachter is also candid in pointing out a sometimes tragic flaw:
While it is undeniable that the promotion and protection of human rights
is an aim of the United Nations, it is an aim that in the understanding of
most member states is to be pursued through general recommendatory resolutions or international conventions of lawmaking character. Interventionist "action" by the Organization to redress violations of human rights has
whether that of international lawyers, political scientists, or international-relations
theorists-is the lack of a commonly accepted framework (incorporating all of the
intellectual tasks) for relating individual effort." Id. at 37.
105. Introduction, supra note 102, at xvi-xvii.
106. Id. at xi.
107. See note 100 supra.
108. Schachter, supra note 101, at 402.
109. Id. at 404.
110. Id. at 403.
111. Id. at 404.
[A]lleviation of massive suffering does not expressly appear as a purpose
or principle of the Charter, though in some cases it may be regarded as
an aspect of basic human rights, more particularly the "right to life" or protection against genocide. It has its own justification, however, and is supported by a general consensus that the international community should seek
to alleviate mass distress among victims of civil strife, at least through providing material supplies and technical services.
Id. at 408.
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of large scale racial disnot been regarded as legitimate except in the case
112
crimination or presumably the threat of genocide.

This view generates a rather cynical air. If the United Nations has such
a policy regarding human rights, then Schachter makes an elaborate justification for inaction. He posits a finely devised United Nations system
but then tells us, in effect, that when it comes to intervening for human
rights purposes, the United Nations can do little. 113 Nothing more can
be done in the United Nations, when violations of fundamental human
rights occur, as in Chile, than to protest, inquire,1 4 offer resolutions and
publish reports. It is this weakness that prompts discussion of the "humanitarian intervention" by a foreign state in the internal conflict of another, 115 for example, India's aid to Bangladesh." 6 The late Professor
Wolfgang Friedmann, who would not dismiss the use of humanitarian intervention out of hand, was very wary of it because it is a concept that
to political abuse as much as to genuine humanitarian conlends itself
7
cern."
The success of regional international organizations is only a little better
according to one author contributing to Law and Civil War in the Modern
World."18 Ms. Frey-Wouters concedes that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the O.A.S. "performed a valuable role in the
Dominican Republic;" 1 9 similarly, in Chile, the Commission energetically
pursued its investigation of human rights violations, producing a compre112. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
113. That seems to be the view of Shirley Hazzard in The United Nations:
Where Governments Go to Church, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1975, at 11. In her
strident manner she describes the UN as an inflated organization, dashing the hopes
of humankind but responsive to the major powers.

She could be right although the

last session of the General Assembly could be interpreted as indicating otherwise.
114. Schachter, supra note 102, at 428-29.
115. Brownlie, HumanitarianIntervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (J. N. Moore ed. 1974); Lillich, HumanitarianIntervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in id. at 229. See Falk,
Comment 1, in id. at 539, 544-45, for caustic remarks on the Brownlie-Lillich debate.

116. One wonders if India's humanitarian concern--or any country's concernfor Bangladesh would have been so keen had it not coincided with India's design to
weaken Pakistan.

Friedmann, Comment 4, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN

WORLD 574, 577 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974).
117. Id. at 577.
118. Frey-Wouters, The Relevance of Regional Arrangements to Internal Conflicts in the Developing World, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 458
(J. N. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Frey-Wouters]. "Regional organizations

have engaged in generally ineffective activities intended to safeguard fundamental human rights, particularly against a threat of widespread loss of life." Id. at 483.
119. Id.at 484.
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hensive study. 12 0 Nevertheless, she laments the fact that the O.A.S. suffers
from domination by the United States. 1 1 Frey-Wouters characterizes the
regional institutions as lacking sufficient resources necessary to sustain a
dynamic and effective structure; as being completely subservient to the
member states; and as possessing secretariats for administrative purposes
only and having no executive capacity which enables them to initiate independent projects. 122 Moreover, internal conflict is ignored as a concept,
and intervention is viewed as undesirable in all cases but those determined
1 23
to be a threat to the other nations of the region.
While Law and Civil War in the Modern World explores intervention
in the internal conflict of a nation by other states, non-governmental
groups or "public" international organizations, International Organization:
Law in Movement is concerned with international organizations, not in the
context of intervention but in the context of their overall work. 1 24 The
latter volume is likable but uneven; the essays are informative but only
a few stand out. One of these is Schachter's article describing the characteristics of the United Nations, notably its circumspection and inhibition." 5
John McMahon, in whose honor International Organization was published, addresses the problem of what an international organization can
do under its constitutive instrument or charter.' 2" Though he focuses on
the Court of the European Communities, his analysis is applicable to international organizations generally. One of McMahon's premises is that
whether judicial interpretation of a charter is provided for or not, the routine practice or work of an institution, with the charter as its guide,
amounts to interpretation. In other words, theory becomes practice
through "day-to-day application."'1 27 McMahon urges breaking the fetters
120.

O.A.S. REPORT, supra note 28.
121. Frey-Wouters, supra note 118, at 462-63.
122. id. at 460.
123. Id. For those interested in scholarly debate descending to the level of
friendly academic rivalry, see Farer, On Professor Moore's Synthesis, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 549 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974) and Moore, On Prolessor Farer'sNeed for a Thesis: A Reply, in id. at 565.
124.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION:

LAW IN MOVEMENT-EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF

JOHN MCMAHON [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION] (J. E. S. Fawcett & R. Higgins eds. 1974).
125. Schachter, Some Reflections on International Officialdom, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 124, at 53. Schachter here offers personal observations, based on almost three decades with the U.N.
126. McMahon, The Court of the European Communities: Judicial Interpretation
and International Organization, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 124,
at 1.

127.

Id. at 2.

It is also important to note that the routine, day-to-day application of the
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of traditional interpretation of treaties, at least in the case of charters.
Quoting Lord McNair, he believes one should see the "differing legal
character of the several kinds of treaties.' 2 A constitutive instrument
is analogous, in his view, to a "written constitution such as that of the
United States.' 1 29 Moreover, implied powers are required in order to fulfill the expectations of express powers." 0 Flexibility and adaptation are
essential because the drafters and signatories could not have foreseen contingencies. 13 An implication to be drawn from McMahon's perception
is that in the area of human rights, the United Nations has failed to practically apply and interpret the Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The result has been, of course, the role of the United
Nations as a restricted bystander-guardian of human rights.
For Ian Brownlie, the United Nations could and should be seen as a
form of government with characteristics similar to those of federal systems.' 32 Though he offers nothing new, his insights are trenchant. According to Brownlie, many have traditionally made "national law the measure of the validity of international law."' 3 This view has been carried
to the extent that the concept of international law is frequently seen as a
myth lo which can be attributed faults and failings which could just as
1 4
well be laid at the feet of any nation.
Judicial settlement of disputes is seen by one of the editors, Rosalyn
Higgins, as a possible alternative to negotiations or intervention." 5 She
contents of a constitutive instrument will inevitably involve its interpretation. . . . It is by means of such practical application and interpretation
that the charter of any international organization becomes a viable instrument responding to the needs of an evolving international society and providing scope for change and adaptability.
Id.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
TIONAL

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 24.
Brownlie, The United Nations as a Form of Government, in
ORGANIZATION,

INTERNA-

supra note 124, at 26, 29.

133. Id. at 26.
134. See id. at 27.
Thus even the more able student will readily refer to the relative invulnerability of the Smith regime in Rhodesia . . .in terms of the "ineffectiveness
of the United Nations" and will find it difficult to accept that the situation
could also be said to be a test of the efficacy of the legal system of the
United Kingdom.
Id.
135. Higgins, The Desirability of Third-Party Adjudication: Conventional Wisdom or Continuing Truth?, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 124, at 37.
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admits courts have limitations and even acknowledges Lord McNair's statement that international courts do not "contribute substantially to the peace
of the world."'1 36 A basic restraint is the fact that courts of law comprise
the adjudicatory system while courts of economic and social policy do
not. 8 7 The solution might be found in "specialist courts" and "regional
courts."'138 In the human rights arena, such a court, with both peculiarities, exists, the European Court of Human Rights. Unfortunately it is the
only one of its kind; however, there is provision for the organization of
of Human Rights in the American Convention
an Inter-American1 3 Court
9
Rights.
of Human
However interesting and informative the remaining articles in International Organization are, they are less important to the discussion of human rights. The book is not a solid study of international institutions but
it offers insights to particular phases of international organizational work.
Despite the failure or inability of the United Nations and other international organizations to intervene in states or enforce human rights law,
there have been significant accomplishments. The United Nations has
been responsible for drafting and opening for signature and ratification the
international human rights covenants and for setting up the Commission
on Human Rights for purposes of channeling protests, undertaking inquiries and initiating publicity. Furthermore, world opinion and pressure
should not be dismissed as a remedy to be used by international organizations. Because nations couch their more devious plans in legal terms and
justify their transgressions by invoking a legal principle, and because states
do not want to be accused of being lawless, a much more effective use
of world opinion could be made. Public international organizations could
40
take a lesson from private organizations such as Amnesty International.
136. Id. at 41-42.
137. Id. at 43.
138. Id. at 43-44.
139. American Convention, supra note 25, ch. VIII.
140. A distinction is made between public and private international organizations.
Examples of the former are, of course, the United Nations, the Organization of
American States and the Asian Development Bank. Under international law, they
are considered "subjects" of that law along with nations. See W. FRIEDMANN, 0.
LIssiTzYN & R. PUOH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 et seq. (1969). Cf. J. L. BRIERLY,
An example of a priTHE LAW OF NATIONS 94 et seq. (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
vate international organization is Amnesty International. It is not a "subject" of international law. (It does have the status of non-governmental organization with the
UN.)
Amnesty, with its more unassuming goals, has proved to be an effective "intervenor" in the protection of human rights. This is not meant to cast aspersions on
the public institutions. The United Nations has worked earnestly and under severe
handicaps to have human rights covenants drafted, signified and ratified. However,
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Amnesty was founded in London in 1961 in response to the imprisonment
of and lack of legal defense for political prisoners in Portugal. 141 Its work
has been on behalf of those imprisoned for their political beliefs-prisoners of conscience. Within the last few years it has turned its attention
to the torture of prisoners, but not to the exclusion of other concerns of
political prisoners. Its goals are modest and its solutions are specific; for
example, Amnesty has recommended that the United Nations and other
concerned groups help Chilean prisoners of conscience by financing lawyers to defend them.1 42 It has been able to mobilize public opinion in
many countries with surprising success. 143 Yet in the context of mass violations of human rights, one cannot be too impressed with the performance
of either private or public international organizations. Hence it is tautologous to say that international organizations must be strengthened. Professor Friedmann concluded that
[i]ntervention is an aspect of restriction of state sovereignty in the name
of a higher principle and authority. The only way to achieve this authority
is the strengthening of authoritative international institutions. But this
cannot be attained without the necessary moral consensus.1 44
CONCLUSION

One conclusion that unfortunately might be drawn from this discussion
of human rights, their violation in Chile and their enforcement by international organizations, is that human rights law--or international law for
that matter-is ineffective, even worse, that it does not exist. This conclusion, however, not only denies legal history but also ignores what law
itself is. Mr. Justice Douglas has written,
[T'he true gauge of law is not command but conduct. Those who move to
the measured beat of custom, mores, or community or world mandates are
obeying law in a real and vivid sense of the term. Law is a force that
shapes and moulds the affairs of men. The fact that there may be no court
to enforce a rule of conduct does not prove that no international law exists.

145

its human rights work is hindered by the considerations of state sovereignty and political consequences. See Scoble & Wiseberg, supra note 3. See also part II in text,
supra, for an example of the work of Amnesty International.
141. Scoble & Wiseberg, supra note 3, at 16. This is a fine survey of Amnesty
and its work.
142. F.C. Newman, B.W. Sumner & R. Plant, Report of Mission to Santiago,
Chile, lst-8th November, 1973, at 6 (Report for Amnesty International, not dated).
143. FRASER REPORT, supra note 36, at 410.
144. Friedmann, Comment 4, in LAw AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD
574, 581 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974).
145.

Douglas, The Rule of Law in World Affairs, in A WORLD WrrHOUT WAR

145, 148 (Washington Square Press ed. 1961).
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Perhaps the conclusion that should be drawn is that international law will
continue to develop. Whether it will develop in response to the needs of
individuals or the demands of institutions, however, is the only issue.
FerdinandMesch

